India and Pakistan: Nuclear Capabilities and Global Implications

This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan as of 2025, examining their warhead stockpiles, delivery systems, doctrines, and command structures. India maintains a "No First Use" policy with a doctrine of massive retaliation, while Pakistan embraces a strategy of "Full Spectrum Deterrence," allowing for first use in a variety of scenarios. The report compares their missile ranges, aircraft, and emerging sea-based deterrents, noting qualitative advancements in both arsenals. It further explores the catastrophic global consequences of a hypothetical nuclear war between the two nations—highlighting environmental fallout, climate disruption, economic collapse, and geopolitical instability. Using current events such as the 2025 Operation Sindoor crisis as context, the report underscores how close the region remains to nuclear escalation, with miscalculation or militant provocation posing ongoing threats. The findings stress the urgency of diplomatic engagement and international safeguards to prevent a conflict that could destabilize the entire planet.

Warheads and Arsenal Size: India is estimated to possess roughly 170–180 nuclear warheads as of 2024–2025. India has produced a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium sufficient for up to 200 warheads (but has likely assembled ~172 warheads). Its warheads are not believed to be mated to missiles in peacetime – they are stored separately under tight control, to be assembled if a launch is authorized. India’s doctrine emphasizes a “credible minimum deterrent”, meaning it seeks only the number of weapons needed to deter adversaries, not parity with larger nuclear powers.

Delivery Systems: India maintains a growing triad of delivery platforms – nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based ballistic missiles, and a nascent sea-based force:

• Air: The Indian Air Force fields nuclear-capable fighter-bombers such as the Mirage 2000H Vajra and the Jaguar IS/IB. India has 3–4 squadrons of these aircraft earmarked for nuclear strike roles against Pakistan or China. These jets can deliver gravity bombs or standoff nuclear munitions.
• Land-Based Missiles: The Army’s Strategic Forces Command operates at least five types of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. These include the short-range Prithvi-II (≈350 km range) and Agni-I (~700 km) for regional targets, the medium-range Agni-II (over 2,000 km), and intermediate-range missiles Agni-III (>3,200 km) and Agni-IV (>3,500 km). India is also introducing newer systems: the Agni-V, a canisterized three-stage missile nearing ICBM range (~5,000–6,000 km), and a modern medium-range Agni-P (1,000–2,000 km) which uses advanced guidance and is also canisterized. These longer-range missiles extend India’s reach to all of Pakistan and much of China. India has roughly 80 land-based missiles deployed as of 2024, organized into missile groups. Most are kept unfueled/unarmed until ordered to launch.
• Sea-Based: India is developing a sea-leg for assured second-strike capability. It has launched two indigenously built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN): INS Arihant (commissioned 2016) and INS Arighat (commissioned 2024). The Arihant-class can carry the K-15 Sagarika SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) with ~750 km range and possibly the under-development K-4 SLBM (~3,500 km range). Currently the K-15 gives India a short-range sea-based option (covering Pakistan or nearby waters), while longer-range SLBMs to target farther adversaries are in progress. With only one SSBN fully operational (Arihant) and limited missile range, India’s sea-based deterrent is nascent – often described as a “technology demonstrator” at this stage. More advanced SSBNs (S4 class and future S5 class) and longer-range SLBMs are under construction to round out India’s nuclear triad.

An Indian Agni-series nuclear-capable ballistic missile on a road-mobile launcher. India deploys several Agni missiles with ranges from ~700 km up to ~5,000+ km.

Command and Control: Ultimate authority over India’s nuclear weapons resides in the civilian leadership. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) is a two-layered body comprised of a Political Council (chaired by the Prime Minister) and an Executive Council (chaired by the National Security Advisor). Only the Political Council – i.e. the Prime Minister and top cabinet members – can authorize a nuclear strike. The Executive Council provides advice and executes the order by conveying it to the military’s Strategic Forces Command. This structure ensures civilian control over nuclear use. India’s warheads and delivery systems are kept de-alerted in peacetime (with warheads stored separately from missiles and aircraft), in line with its doctrine of No First Use (NFU). India has publicly pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, reserving them for retaliation only if India is attacked with nuclear weapons. (Notably, since 2003 India has added that it may respond with nuclear weapons to major biological or chemical attacks as well, blurring the NFU pledge slightly.) India’s declared strategy is one of “massive retaliation” – i.e. absorbing a first strike and responding with a devastating nuclear counterattack to inflict “unacceptable damage” on the aggressor. This implies India would retaliate even against a limited nuclear strike with a large-scale nuclear response, aiming to deter any nuclear use by an adversary. India’s targeting policy is primarily counter-value, meaning enemy cities and industrial centers would be targeted to maximize deterrent effect, rather than a counter-force strike on enemy nuclear assets. India also asserts that its nuclear weapons are strictly for deterrence, not for battlefield warfighting – it has abjured development of tactical nuclear weapons and focuses on strategic deterrence roles.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Capabilities and Doctrine

Warheads and Arsenal Size: Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile is in the same league as India’s, estimated at roughly 165–170 warheads as of 2023. This arsenal has grown steadily in recent years and could approach ~200 warheads by the late 2020s if current trends continue. Pakistan has been expanding its fissile material production – operating at least four plutonium production reactors and a robust uranium enrichment program – which gives it the capacity to build several additional warheads per year. Like India, Pakistan does not disclose its arsenal details; these estimates come from independent analyses. Pakistan’s warheads are believed to be stored in a disassembled state under high security in centralized storage during peacetime, with components brought together only when orders are given. However, as Pakistan plans for potential first-use, some warheads for short-range systems might be kept at a higher readiness (mated or able to be mated quickly) under careful control.

Delivery Systems: Pakistan has developed a wide array of nuclear delivery vehicles, focusing on mobile land-based missiles and aircraft, and is working on a sea-based leg. Its doctrine of “full spectrum deterrence” is reflected in having nuclear options ranging from short-range battlefield weapons to longer-range missiles that can reach all of India:

• Land-Based Ballistic Missiles: The Pakistan Army’s Army Strategic Forces Command operates at least six types of road-mobile ballistic missiles that are nuclear-capable:Pakistan has dispersed its missile units across several bases. Short-range systems (Nasr, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, Babur cruise) are positioned in southern and eastern Pakistan near the Indian border, while medium-range assets (Shaheen-II, Ghauri) are based further inland for strategic depth. In recent years, Pakistan has reduced the frequency of missile tests, possibly due to political and economic turbulence, but continues to refine its missile forces.
  • Hatf-2 Abdali: Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), ~200 km range. An older system tested in the 2000s; it can carry a nuclear warhead but may be gradually superseded by newer missiles.
  • Hatf-3 Ghaznavi: SRBM, ~290 km range. Solid-fueled and deployed on mobile launchers, it can strike close Indian targets but not major inland cities like Delhi.
  • Hatf-4 Shaheen-I (and upgraded Shaheen-1A): Single-stage solid SRBM. Shaheen-I range ~650 km, and Shaheen-1A up to ~900 km. Deployed since early 2000s, gives Pakistan the ability to hit targets across northwestern and western India. An extended-range Shaheen-1A was tested multiple times in 2021, indicating induction of the longer 900 km version.
  • Hatf-9 Nasr: Highly short-range solid-fuel missile (~60–70 km range) intended for battlefield use. The Nasr is a small, quick-reaction missile carrying a low-yield warhead; it is deployed on a mobile launcher that holds 4 missile tubes. Its limited range means it cannot hit strategic targets, but it is designed to halt invading Indian forces on Pakistani soil by threatening tactical nuclear strikes. This system, introduced around 2013, explicitly aims to counter India’s conventional “Cold Start” doctrine by lowering the threshold for nuclear use to the tactical level.
  • Hatf-5 Ghauri: Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), ~1,200–1,500 km range. The Ghauri is a liquid-fueled missile (based on North Korea’s Nodong) that can carry a nuclear warhead deep into Indian territory. It has been operational for many years as part of Pakistan’s strategic forces.
  • Hatf-6 Shaheen-II: MRBM, two-stage solid propellant, ~1,500–2,000 km range. The Shaheen-II has been deployed after a long development; it can reach all of India’s major cities. U.S. intelligence estimates Pakistan has “fewer than 50” Shaheen-II launchers deployed. This missile allows Pakistan to station units deeper within its own territory while still covering targets across India.
  • Shaheen-III: (Under development) A planned longer-range ballistic missile tested multiple times (most recently April 2022). Range ~2,750 km, making it Pakistan’s longest-range missile. The Shaheen-III is intended to reach India’s farthest territories (e.g. the Andaman & Nicobar Islands) and deny any “safe haven” to India’s strategic forces. It is not yet operationally deployed.
  • Ababeel: (Under development) A medium-range ballistic missile reported to incorporate MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) technology. Range is thought to be ~2,200 km. The Ababeel, first tested in 2017, would allow Pakistan to deliver several warheads on one missile to saturate or penetrate missile defenses. As of 2025 it remains in development and not yet deployed.
• Cruise Missiles: Pakistan has developed nuclear-capable cruise missiles to add a stealthy delivery option:
  • Babur (Hatf-7): A ground-launched subsonic cruise missile with an estimated range of ~450 km (improved variants Babur-1A/B possibly up to 700 km). It can carry a nuclear warhead and fly at low altitudes to evade radar. Babur gives Pakistan a terrain-hugging strike capability against targets in India. An enhanced version (Babur-2/B or Babur-1B) has been tested, and a sea-launched variant is in development (see Babur-3 below).
  • Ra’ad (Hatf-8): An air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), range ~350 km (Ra’ad-II extended to ~600 km). The Ra’ad can be carried by Pakistan’s fighter jets (e.g. Mirage III/5) to deliver a nuclear strike from standoff range. It was displayed in military parades in recent years, indicating operational status.
  • Babur-3: This is the submarine-launched version of the Babur cruise missile, with ~450 km range. It has been test launched twice (in 2017 and 2018) from an underwater platform. Babur-3 is intended to arm Pakistan’s submarines, giving it a “second-strike” capability from the sea. Once deployed, Babur-3 on submarines would complete Pakistan’s nuclear triad. The Pakistani Navy’s three Agosta-90B diesel-electric submarines are likely to be equipped with Babur-3 missiles fired from their torpedo tubes. Pakistan is also acquiring new Chinese-built submarines (Hangor class, with air-independent propulsion) expected by late 2020s, which could carry these nuclear cruise missiles. Pakistan established a Naval Strategic Forces Command in 2012 to oversee the sea-based deterrent, signaling the importance of eventually fielding nuclear-armed subs.
• Aircraft: The Pakistan Air Force can deliver nuclear bombs using fighter aircraft. Its legacy nuclear strike platforms are believed to be F-16A/B Fighting Falcons and Mirage V jets, which have been modified to carry nuclear gravity bombs or possibly the Ra’ad ALCM. These aircraft give Pakistan a flexible delivery mode, though using manned planes for nuclear delivery is slower and riskier than missiles. (There is speculation that Pakistan’s JF-17 fighters could also be given a nuclear role in the future, but the F-16s and Mirages are the primary nuclear-capable squadrons at present.) Aircraft-delivered nuclear capability provides redundancy and a potential second-strike option if missile forces were neutralized – pilots can be dispersed and launched on short notice.

Command and Control: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is controlled by the National Command Authority (NCA), a body that includes both civilian leaders and top military officials. The NCA is chaired by the Prime Minister (since 2009), but the military plays a dominant role in nuclear decision-making and operations. The NCA has a strategic committee structure (an Employment Control Committee for use and a Development Control Committee for technical development). Day-to-day management is handled by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) – a dedicated secretariat staffed largely by military officers that oversees security, handling, and deployment of nuclear weapons. The SPD, led by a senior Army general, ensures rigorous personnel reliability and a multilayered permission system for any nuclear launch.

Pakistan’s doctrine, unlike India’s, does not espouse No First Use. In fact, Pakistan explicitly keeps open the option to use nuclear weapons first if it perceives an existential threat from Indian conventional forces. Its nuclear policy is termed “Full Spectrum Deterrence”, which former SPD chief Gen. Khalid Kidwai describes as covering “the full spectrum of threats – strategic, operational, tactical – with weapons of appropriate range and yield to deter all levels of aggression”. In practice, this means:

• Pakistan has developed low-yield, short-range nuclear weapons (like the Nasr SRBM) for tactical use against Indian troops on Pakistani soil if Pakistan is losing ground, thereby deterring India from any deep incursion. By having “battlefield nukes,” Pakistan signals that even a limited conventional attack could trigger a nuclear response, hoping to “seal off” any space for conventional war.
• At the other end, Pakistan also has longer-range, higher-yield weapons to strike major Indian cities (counter-value) or military bases (counter-force) if a wider war erupted. Its officials warn that if India were to attempt a disarming strike or enact its “massive retaliation,” Pakistan’s retaliation in return would be equally massive – essentially a capability for assured destruction on both sides.
• This posture means Pakistan deliberately maintains ambiguity about its red lines and could use nuclear weapons first under several possible scenarios: for example, if Indian conventional forces penetrate too far or seize a large territory, if India destroys a large portion of Pakistan’s military, if India tries economic strangulation or carpet bombing, etc. By keeping these thresholds fuzzy, Pakistan aims to dissuade India from testing the limits. In summary, Pakistan’s doctrine is one of deterrence by denial – threatening even limited nuclear use to deny India its conventional objectives.

Importantly, even though Pakistan’s Prime Minister is the nominal head of the NCA, in a crisis the final launch decisions would likely involve the Army leadership. The military’s tight control is intended to prevent unauthorized use while enabling a rapid response if needed. Pakistani officials claim their launch authorization requires multiple personnel (“two-man” or “three-man” rule) and verified codes, similar to other nuclear powers, to ensure no accidental or rogue launches. The centralized control is balanced with pre-delegation protocols for battlefield use: if communications are cut off during war, field commanders may have pre-arranged clearance to use certain tactical nukes as a last resort – though details are secret.

Comparison of India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces

To illustrate the two arsenals side by side, the table below highlights key aspects of nuclear capability and policy for India and Pakistan:

A nuclear war in South Asia would be a humanitarian and environmental catastrophe reaching far beyond the two countries. Even a “limited” exchange of dozens of nuclear weapons would have severe regional and global consequences. Below we assess potential impacts in three key domains:

Environmental and Climate Effects

The detonation of nuclear weapons over cities and industrial areas would ignite massive fires, injecting millions of tons of soot (black carbon) into the upper atmosphere. Climate scientists predict this would trigger a “nuclear winter”-like scenario on a global scale. One study examined a scenario of 100 low-yield nuclear explosions (50 per side, similar to Hiroshima-sized bombs) in an India-Pakistan war: the firestorms could loft about 5 million tons of soot into the stratosphere. The result would be worldwide stratospheric smoke coverage, blocking sunlight. Researchers project a drop in average global surface temperature by ~1.8°C lasting for at least 5 years. For comparison, an Ice Age vs. modern climate is ~5°C difference – so a nearly 2°C cooling would be an unprecedented climate shock in modern times. This scenario also showed global precipitation would fall ex. the Asian monsoon could weaken dramatically.

The loss of sunlight and shorter growing seasons would cause crops to fail across the world. The cited study found yields of major cereal crops (maize, wheat, rice, soy) could decline ~11% on average over the first five years after the war, with recovery taking a decade or more. In nations at higher latitudes – e.g. Canada, Russia, US – crop yields could plummet by 20–40% due to shorter summers and frost, while in tropical regions the absolute temperature drop is less but rainfall disruption could wreck agriculture. This level of crop failure “would exceed the largest famine in documented history”, according to the authors. Food reserves would be exhausted, and hundreds of millions or even billions of people globally could face food insecurity. Another analysis (Toon et al., 2019) modeled a larger India-Pakistan war using most of their arsenals (hundreds of weapons) – it predicted 20–35% reduction in sunlight, cooling of 4–8°C on land, and 15–30% less rainfall globally, persisting over a decade. Such a severe nuclear winter could put up to 2 billion people at risk of starvation worldwide.

Closer to the conflict zone, the immediate environmental effects would be acute. Nuclear fireballs and shockwaves would obliterate urban environments. South Asia’s dense cities would suffer firestorms generating intense winds and toxic smoke. Fallout (radioactive debris) would spread downwind – potentially contaminating large parts of India, Pakistan, and neighboring countries. Prevailing winds could carry radiation toward Afghanistan, Iran, or the Himalayas. The Indus and Ganges river plains, the breadbaskets of the region, might see black radioactive rain, poisoning water and soil. Survivors in the region could face radiation sickness, crop failure, and contaminated food/water supplies for years. The direct blast, fire, and radiation in India and Pakistan could kill an estimated 50 to 125 million people almost immediately in a full-scale exchange – a toll “2.5 times as many people as died worldwide in World War II” within a single week. This unprecedented destruction of human life and infrastructure would leave the subcontinent’s environment shattered. Critical ecosystems could be decimated (for instance, fires in forests and oil refineries would produce chemical toxins, and soot deposition could harm coral reefs in the Indian Ocean).

In summary, beyond the horrific local devastation, an Indo-Pak nuclear war is likely to cause planetary climate disruption. Soot-induced cooling (a nuclear twilight) and ozone layer damage would make the whole world effectively a downwind victim of the war. Even a “limited” regional nuclear conflict has no purely local outcome – the climate effects know no borders.

Geopolitical and Regional Impacts

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would fundamentally alter global geopolitics. In the immediate aftermath, the international community would face chaos and crisis management on a scale never seen before. Some key geopolitical impacts include:

• Humanitarian Crisis and Refugees: The strike zones in South Asia would generate millions of refugees fleeing devastation and radiation. Neighboring countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, China (Tibet) could see desperate influxes of survivors, though some neighbors might themselves be partially affected by fallout. Managing radiation refugees would be extraordinarily difficult – these populations might need relocation far from contaminated zones. The burden on the international humanitarian system would dwarf anything in history. We could expect a refugee crisis in the millions to tens of millions, as people flee uninhabitable cities (for example, if Karachi and Lahore are hit, survivors might mass migrate to other parts of Pakistan or attempt to cross into Iran/West Asia; if New Delhi or Mumbai are hit, survivors might flee toward South India or abroad by sea). This would likely trigger mass migration across Asia and beyond, with receiving countries struggling to provide shelter, medical care, and food amidst global shortages.
• Regional Destabilization: South Asia’s political landscape would be shattered. India and Pakistan’s governments (and chain of command) might be decapitated or paralyzed by the nuclear blows. In a worst-case scenario, state collapse could occur in one or both countries if governance breaks down completely. That raises the specter of nuclear weapons or materials lost from custody – a nuclear security nightmare (e.g. stray weapons in the rubble accessible to militant groups). Even if governments remain intact, both countries would be in a state of emergency. Martial law and massive international aid efforts would be likely.

Neighboring powers like China and Russia might move to secure their borders and render assistance (China, sharing borders with both India and Pakistan, would be extremely alarmed by nuclear fallout drifting into its territory and by the vacuum of power if the Indian government collapses). Long-standing alliances and rivalries could shift: for instance, China, a close ally of Pakistan, might intervene diplomatically or even militarily to stabilize Pakistan, while the United States and other nations would scramble to prevent the conflict from reigniting or spreading. Kashmir, the flashpoint of many Indo-Pak conflicts, would be a radioactive wasteland in a nuclear war scenario – effectively removing the core territorial dispute but at an unfathomable cost.

• Great Power Tensions: A nuclear war in South Asia would immediately engage the major nuclear powers. The U.S., China, and Russia (all members of the UN Security Council) would likely convene emergency sessions to manage the fallout. NATO allies, and possibly UN peacekeeping forces, might be called on to secure nuclear sites or provide relief. There could be risks of misunderstanding – for example, China might go on high nuclear alert if it fears Indian missiles (aimed at Pakistan) could stray toward China, or if India’s arsenal against China is also involved. The U.S. might raise alert levels for its forces in the region (and would be concerned about its citizens and bases in the area). While direct superpower conflict is unlikely (all would be focused on de-escalation), the stress on international diplomacy would be extreme. The global nuclear order would be shaken – the taboo against nuclear use broken, potentially eroding non-proliferation regimes as other countries reconsider their security (some nations might pursue their own nuclear weapons, saying “deterrence failed in South Asia, we need our own”). Alternatively, the horror could spur new urgency for arms control and disarmament treaties – a global movement to ban nukes might gain traction, led by the unprecedented humanitarian impact witnessed.
• Security of Other Regions: Other tense regions (Korean Peninsula, Middle East) would face renewed scrutiny. For example, if a nuclear war happens in South Asia, Israel and its adversaries, or North Korea and South Korea, might either be deterred by the example or perversely emboldened (seeing that nuclear use, while catastrophic, achieved some end). The risk of copycat escalations or panic (Japan and South Korea might suddenly want nuclear weapons, Iran’s stance might harden, etc.) is real. The global balance of power could shift if India (a key player in the Indo-Pacific balance vis-à-vis China) is devastated; China could emerge relatively stronger in Asia if India is removed as a rival. However, China would also suffer economic and environmental fallout from the war, so it may not benefit in the near-term.

In South Asia, any survivors would live under the shadow of two wrecked nations. A power vacuum could allow terrorist groups or separatist movements to rise from the ashes. Pakistan’s internal cohesion might unravel – for instance, ethnic separatist groups in Baluchistan or Sindh might seize the chaos to break away. In India, communal tensions could explode amid the breakdown of order (Hindu-Muslim violence could be inflamed by accusations over who “caused” the war). Stabilizing the region would be a generational challenge requiring international oversight.

Economic and Global Market Impacts

Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis, a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan would deliver a devastating shock to the global economy. Some anticipated effects:

• Destruction of Two Economies: India is the world’s fifth-largest economy (around $3.5 trillion GDP in 2025) and a key node in global markets (IT services, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals). Pakistan, while smaller, is strategically located and a significant regional economy. A nuclear war would instantly annihilate a large portion of this economic capacity – major cities like Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Karachi, Lahore – all engines of commerce – could be reduced to ash. Critical infrastructure (ports, airports, power grids, telecoms, factories) would be destroyed. The loss of India’s economy alone would remove a major growth engine of Asia. The global supply chain would suffer severe disruptions, as India is a major producer of generic medicines, vaccines, textiles, auto parts, and IT outsourcing services for companies worldwide. For example:
  • The pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on Indian manufacturers for generic drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients – their destruction could lead to worldwide drug shortages.
  • Information technology and business process outsourcing: countless Western companies depend on Indian IT professionals and call centers – the sudden loss of millions of skilled workers and IT hubs in Bengaluru, Hyderabad, etc. would impair corporate operations globally.
  • Textiles and apparel: South Asia is a manufacturing hub for garments; global retail supply chains would be disrupted.
  • Key ports on the Arabian Sea (like Mumbai, Karachi) might be irradiated ruins, affecting shipping routes and forcing detours or port closures in the region.
  • The Indus Basin and Punjab (spanning Pakistan and India), a critical agricultural region, would be contaminated and out of production – removing a key source of food and cotton from global markets.
• Global Markets Panic: The immediate reaction in global financial markets would be panic. Stock markets worldwide could plummet in the wake of nuclear exchange news, as investors flee to safety. The Indian stock market would of course be gone, and Pakistan’s as well – but exchanges from London to New York to Tokyo would likely see historic crashes due to the sudden geopolitical uncertainty and anticipated economic fallout. Insurance and reinsurance industries would face unprecedented claims (though nuclear war is often an excluded clause, the general devastation to assets would cause cascading defaults). Currencies could fluctuate wildly – one might expect the U.S. dollar, Swiss franc, gold, and other traditional safe havens to surge, while currencies in Asia tumble.
• Trade and Commodity Shocks: South Asia’s destruction would affect commodities:
  • Energy: While India and Pakistan are not major oil producers, they are significant consumers. The obliteration of demand in South Asia might initially cause a drop in oil prices. However, there could also be supply risks – for instance, if conflict disrupts shipping in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf (through which oil tankers pass). Insurance rates for vessels in the region would skyrocket or shipping might halt due to radioactive seas and ports. The net effect on oil could be unpredictable – possibly extreme volatility with an initial price spike from panic, then a depression due to demand collapse and global recession.
  • Food commodities: As mentioned, agricultural output would fall globally. Grain-exporting countries might impose bans, leading to soaring prices for wheat, corn, rice. Famine-struck countries would bid up food imports, exhausting world grain reserves. Food prices could reach record highs, sparking unrest in other parts of the world.
  • Manufactured goods and rare materials: India is a key supplier of processed diamonds, auto parts, and some critical minerals processing. Loss of these could create bottlenecks in manufacturing elsewhere.
• Global Economic Recession/Depression: The combined effect of the supply shock (loss of goods from South Asia), the demand shock (destruction of ~1.6 billion consumers – India and Pakistan’s population – and their incomes), and the financial shock would likely thrust the world into a severe economic depression. Some economists have estimated that a nuclear war could knock several percentage points off global GDP growth for years. The climate-induced agricultural crash would further reduce global economic output (farming is a large employer worldwide; rural economies would suffer). Tourism, aviation, and other industries would stagnate out of fear and mourning. The cost of reconstruction (if possible) in South Asia would be in the many trillions, and much of it would fall on the international community.
• Long-Term Recovery: In the very long term (decades out), the global economy might adapt to a colder climate and the absence of South Asia’s contribution. New supply chains would form, and some manufacturing could shift to other developing countries. But for a generation or more, the world would live with significantly lowered economic output, altered trade patterns, and persistent humanitarian costs (healthcare for billions affected by famine or radiation-related illnesses).
• Financial Systems and Political Economy: The shock might lead to a rethink of globalization – exposing how a catastrophe in one region cripples the whole world. Countries might turn inward, prioritizing self-sufficiency in food and energy after seeing global supply chains fail. This de-globalization could further slow growth and increase poverty. International institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and UN would be stretched to their limits coordinating relief and reconstruction funds. It’s possible new international regimes would arise – for instance, a “Global Nuclear Disaster Fund” or stronger arms control agreements tying financial incentives to disarmament.

In essence, a nuclear war in South Asia would reverberate through every market and every nation. No country or business operating in today’s interconnected world would be untouched by the economic fallout, whether through direct supply chain links, refugee flows, or climate-driven scarcity of resources. The doomsday scenario underscores why preventing such a war is in the vital interest of all humanity.

Current Tensions and Recent Developments (as of 2025)

India and Pakistan’s rivalry remains one of the world’s most volatile nuclear flashpoints. As of 2025, relations are deeply strained, with intermittent crises highlighting the risk of escalation. A brief overview of recent tensions and policy shifts:

• Post-2019 Chill: In February 2019, a suicide bombing in Indian-controlled Kashmir (Pulwama) killed 40 Indian paramilitaries, prompting India to carry out airstrikes on Balakot in Pakistan – the first Indian air strike on Pakistani territory in decades. Pakistan retaliated the next day with aerial combat, shooting down an Indian MiG-21 and capturing a pilot. During that crisis, Pakistan reportedly convened its NCA (National Command Authority) as a signal, with a senior official pointedly alluding to possible nuclear consequences if the conflict worsened. This close brush with war underscored the ever-present nuclear shadow over their disputes. After international intervention, tensions cooled slightly and the captured pilot was returned, but diplomatic relations went into deep freeze. Later in 2019, India revoked the special autonomous status of Jammu & Kashmir, a move fiercely condemned by Pakistan. Islamabad downgraded diplomatic ties and halted bilateral trade. Since then, formal dialogue between the two has virtually ceased.
• Ceasefire but No Peace: In early 2021, both sides unexpectedly agreed to re-implement a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, reaffirming a 2003 ceasefire accord. This has largely held – cross-border shelling incidents dropped sharply in 2021–2022, bringing a measure of calm to the LOC after years of routine exchanges of fire. The ceasefire deal was reportedly facilitated through backchannels and was a rare instance of cooperation. However, it did not extend to a broader diplomatic thaw. Each government remained publicly hostile: India insists that Pakistan curb Islamist militancy before any talks, while Pakistan insists on discussing Kashmir’s status. Thus, beyond the LOC quiet, a cold peace prevails – active conflict was avoided in recent years, but distrust runs high.
• Accidental Missile Launch (2022): A stark reminder of how fraught the situation remains came in March 2022, when India accidentally launched a BrahMos supersonic cruise missile that landed 124 km inside Pakistan. The unarmed missile malfunction (during a routine maintenance, by India’s account) could have been misinterpreted as an attack. Pakistan protested that it received no timely notification via the hotline and scrambled its air defenses. Fortunately, the missile hit no populated area and India quickly acknowledged the accident, preventing escalation. But analysts noted if this happened amid a crisis, Pakistan’s trigger-fingers might not have waited for explanations. This incident spurred both sides to examine safety protocols – a wake-up call that miscalculation or technical error could ignite war even when neither side desires it.
• Growing Nuclear Capabilities: Throughout this period, both nations continued to modernize their nuclear forces. India focused increasingly on China – testing longer-range Agni-5 missiles and expanding its SSBN fleet (INS Arighat was quietly commissioned in 2024). However, these same enhancements (like canisterized missiles for quicker launch) also improve India’s readiness vis-à-vis Pakistan. Indian officials have occasionally debated their nuclear doctrine – for instance, some strategists suggest that if Pakistan threatens tactical nuclear use, India might need more flexible options than massive retaliation. But officially, India’s NFU and retaliation doctrine remain in place (though defense ministers have hinted “circumstances will determine” future policy, injecting slight ambiguity). Pakistan for its part tested new missiles like an improved Shaheen-1A and recently showcased MIRV-capable Ababeel (though not yet operational). Islamabad also prioritized deployment of tactical nukes (Nasr) and development of Babur-3 for a sea-based deterrent, explicitly citing India’s conventional threats and naval nuclear developments as justification.
• Political Landscape: Domestic politics in both countries influence the relationship. In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi takes a hard line on Pakistan, leveraging a nationalist stance. In Pakistan, the military and political leadership have been in flux – Imran Khan’s government (2018–2022) made no progress with India, and after his ouster, political turmoil and economic crisis consumed Islamabad’s attention. Neither side’s leadership has made serious overtures for dialogue; if anything, public opinion and rhetoric remain tense. For example, India frequently condemns Pakistan at international forums for supporting militant proxies, while Pakistan accuses India of human rights abuses in Kashmir and sponsors protests to internationalize the issue. This war of words keeps relations frosty.
• 2025 Escalation – “Operation Sindoor”: In a stark development, May 2025 saw the most serious military confrontation between the two countries since 2019. A militant attack in Pahalgam (Indian Kashmir) that killed several tourists sparked a sharp escalation. India launched a large-scale punitive operation dubbed Operation Sindoor on May 6–7, 2025, striking nine targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. These targets included alleged training camps of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba (the groups India blames for terror attacks) in places like Muzaffarabad (PoK) and Muridke (Pakistan). India’s use of missiles and guided bombs on multiple sites resulted in dozens of deaths, including militants and some civilians, according to reports. Pakistan vehemently protested and vowed retaliation, claiming it shot down several Indian jets and drones (India denied this). For several days, the world held its breath as firefights and air skirmishes occurred along the border. International appeals poured in urging restraint. By mid-May, both sides stepped back from the brink – Pakistan’s retaliation remained limited (artillery fire and a couple of attempted air intercepts), and India declared its operation accomplished and pulled back. Still, this episode illustrated how quickly the situation can become perilous. It “heightened fears of a broader conflict ... marking the most significant confrontation since 2019”. That it did not mushroom further owes much to pressure from global powers and perhaps behind-the-scenes contacts – but the risk of miscalculation was again on display. Each such crisis runs the danger of crossing the nuclear threshold.
• Ongoing Risks: Despite periods of calm, the fundamental disputes – Kashmir, cross-border terrorism, and military imbalance – remain unsolved. Both countries continue to accuse each other: India points to ceasefire violations and insurgency support, Pakistan points to incidents like India’s abrogation of Kashmir’s autonomy and a persistent arms build-up. A particular concern is that India’s focus on China (after lethal border clashes with China in 2020, India sees China as a bigger threat now) might lead India to significantly expand its nuclear and missile arsenal. This, in turn, could spur Pakistan to further enlarge its own stockpile to avoid being outpaced. The nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia thus grinds on, albeit at a slower quantitative pace than Cold War superpowers but with steady qualitative improvements.

In conclusion, as of 2025 India and Pakistan are locked in a classic security dilemma – a cycle of distrust and military preparations under the nuclear shadow. Occasional confidence-building measures (like the border ceasefire or routine exchanges of lists of nuclear facilities as per a 1988 agreement) provide only thin reassurance. The specter of escalation – by design or accident – is ever-present. Each crisis, like those in 2019 and 2025, underscores how quickly events can spiral and how close the world could come to a nuclear disaster. Both sides profess that nuclear weapons are meant to prevent war, yet their continued hostility and the growing complexity of their arsenals mean the risk of miscalculation cannot be ignored. The international community remains on edge watching this rivalry: ensuring that deterrence holds and that dialogue someday replaces gunfire is crucial to prevent the unthinkable humanitarian and global consequences outlined above. As recent history shows, without sustained diplomatic engagement, South Asia will continue to be one of the most dangerous fault lines on the planet.

Sources:

1. Kristensen, Hans M., et al. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists – “Indian Nuclear Weapons, 2024” (Sep 2024) – Indian arsenal size and modernization
2. Federation of American Scientists – Status of World Nuclear Forces 2025 – Warhead stockpiles (India ~180, Pakistan ~170)
3. The Indian Express (June 18, 2024) – SIPRI report on warhead counts (India 172 vs Pakistan 170)
4. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists – “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons, 2023” (Sep 2023) – Pakistani arsenal and doctrine (full spectrum deterrence)
5. Kidwai, Khalid (2023), via ISSI speech – Explanation of Full Spectrum Deterrence (ranges up to 2750 km, tactical to strategic)
6. Bulletin Nuclear Notebook & Dawn – Details on Pakistani missiles (Nasr 60–70 km, Shaheen-III 2750 km, Babur-3 development)
7. Kanwal, Gurmeet – Carnegie Endowment (2016) “India’s Nuclear Force Structure” – India’s doctrine (NFU, massive retaliation, counter-value targeting)
8. Arms Control Association (Kerry Boyd, 2003) – India’s Nuclear Command Authority setup (Political Council PM, Executive Council NSA)
9. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) – Pakistan’s NCA and SPD (military influence over nuclear decisions)
10. Columbia University – Climate Effects of Nuclear War (2020) – Study on nuclear winter from India-Pakistan war (5 Tg soot, 1.8°C cooling, crop loss)
11. Toon et al. in Science Advances (2019) via ICAN – Large-scale war scenario (125 million dead, 20–35% sunlight loss, 2 billion famine risk)
12. Reuters & BBC News – Coverage of India-Pakistan crises (Balakot 2019, 2022 missile mishap, 2025 Operation Sindoor)
13. CFR Global Conflict Tracker (2025 update) – Recent escalation and context.